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Abstract
In software engineering, risk is usually considered and analyzed during, or
even after, the system design. Countermeasures are elaborated and then accom-
modated as a refinement of the design, when a limited number of changes are still
possible and they may introduce the problem of revisiting the initial requirements.
In this paper, we propose a goal-oriented approach for modeling and reasoning
about risk during the requirements analysis process. Risks are introduced and an-
alyzed along the stakeholders’ goals and countermeasures are introduced as part
of the system’s requirements. The approach extends the Tropos formal framework
with new concepts and qualitative risk reasoning mechanisms. We use a case study
on loan origination process to illustrate the proposal.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, in software engineering risk analysis is used to identify the high risk el-
ements of a project and provide ways of documenting the impact of risk mitigation
strategies [26]. Risk analysis has been also shown important in the software design
phase to evaluate criticality of the system [4], where risks are analyzed and neces-
sary countermeasures are introduced. Usually, countermeasures correspond to a de-
sign/system fine-tuning and then with a limited margin of change. However, it may
happen that the risk reduction results in the revision of the entire design and possibly
of the initial requirements, introducing thus extra costs for the project.
Considering risk since the early phases of the software development process can
be useful to prevent such problems and, as effect, to contain costs [9]. Particularly,
analyzing risk along stakeholders’ needs and objectives, namely before requirements
elicitation, can introduce good and valuable criteria to evaluate and choose among dif-
ferent alternative requirements.
Goal-oriented requirement engineering is an emerging research area where the con-
cept of goal is used to model early requirements and non-functional requirements for a
software system. The use of goals facilitates the analyst to understand the objectives of
stakeholders and then motivate within the organizational setting the system’s require-
ments. KAOS [10], i* [36], GBRAM [2] and Tropos [5] are examples of goal-oriented
methodologies and frameworks that have recently gained popularity in the community.
Particularly, Tropos is a requirement-driven development methodology based on
the i* modeling framework. Tropos proposes an early requirements analysis phase,
where the analyst identifies the relevant stakeholders and models them as social ac-
tors, who depend on one another for goals to be fulfilled, tasks to be performed, and
resources to be furnished. Through these dependencies, one can answer why ques-
tions, besides what and how, regarding system functionalities/requirements. Answers
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to why questions ultimately link system functionalities to stakeholders’ needs, pref-
erences and objectives. Moreover, the methodology analyzes goals by a refinement
process in which each goal is decomposed into subgoals and positive/negative contri-
butions are established among goals. For example, in the case of a loan origination
process the goal of assess loan applications can be OR-decomposed in assessed
by in-house and assessed by Credit Bureau1, while the goal receive electronic
application may help (i.e., contributes positively) to verify loan application, the
bank can indeed validate automatically the application with appropriated agencies.
Through goal models, the analyst can analyze alternative ways for the satisfaction
of stakeholders’ goals and choose among them on the base on specific criteria, like
for example minimum-cost [28]. However, Tropos, as well as other goal-oriented ap-
proaches, does not consider risk within its requirements analysis process, and it may
happen that the cheapest alternative corresponds to the most risky one. For instance,
suppose that in order to receive loan application the bank can either receive
electronic application or receive hard-copy application. Although, the electronic
solution can economize the loan originating process, it can introduce a high level of
risk due, for example, to the forgery of the application by external hackers or even by
internal employees.
In this paper, we propose a goal-oriented approach for modeling and reasoning
about risk at requirements level. The approach is based on Tropos methodology and
proposes and extension of the original Tropos goal modeling and reasoning framework
introducing a three layers model: goal, event, and treatment. Goals are AND/OR-
decomposed and related to external events that can influence negatively (risk) their
satisfaction. Treatments are then introduced to mitigate the effects of such events. We
propose qualitative risk reasoning techniques to support the analyst in evaluating and
choose among different possible sub-goals-trees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related
work and our main contribution. Section 3 introduces the Loan Origination Process
case study that is used to describe the goal-risk analysis framework (Section 4). The
risk analysis process and algorithms for qualitative reasoning are presented in Sec-
tion 5, while in Section 6 we describe the developed CASE tool along some experi-
mental results. Finally, we conclude the paper with a final discussion in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Related Work
Related work lies on three major areas: requirement engineering, secure and depend-
able engineering, and risk analysis.
In requirement engineering, Dardenne et al. [10] propose KAOS, a goal-oriented
requirements engineering methodology aiming at modeling not only what and how
aspect of requirements but also why, who, and when. KAOS introduces also the con-
cept of obstacles [35] and anti-goal [34] which can be seen as boundaries in require-
ment analysis. An obstacle is defined as an undesirable behavior to strategic interests
of stakeholders, and an anti-goal defines a goal that belongs to an attacker that ob-
structs the fulfillment of stakeholders’ goals. In other word, obstacles can be seen as
unintentional-risk, since risk is an undesirable behavior, and anti-goals are threats or
intentional risks. These features make KAOS suitable for analyzing requirements of
1The company that provides credit information and assesses loan applications
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secure and dependable system. In [35], van Lamswerdee and Latier demonstrate how
to derive obstacles and guarantee their completeness from a goal structure and the an-
alyst’s knowledge about the system.
Mayer et al. [23] extend the i* conceptual framework [36] to analyze risk and se-
curity issues during the development process of IT systems, requirement analysis in
particular. The framework models the business assets (i.e., goals) of an organization
and assets of its IT system (i.e., architecture, design decisions). Countermeasures to
mitigate risks are then selected in such a way that the risks do not affect these assets.
Liu et al. [20] propose a methodological framework for security requirements analysis
based on i*. They use the NFR framework [8] to support the formal analysis of threats,
vulnerabilities, and countermeasures.
In the area of secure and dependable system, the most used frameworks are
the classical ones, namely Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [32], Failure Modes, Effects,
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) [1]. In security engineering, approaches like at-
tack tree and threat tree [15, 27] are similar to the FTA, while others proposals like
UMLSec [17], SecureUML [21], Abuse Case [24], and Misuse Case [31] are funded
on UML as modeling language. However, the most relevant work for our purpose
is Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) by Feather et al. [12] has been developed
and applied in Jet Propulsion Lab of NASA. DDP consists of a three layers model:
Objectives, Risks, and Mitigation. Each objective has a weight to represent its im-
portance, each risk has a likelihood of occurrence, while mitigation has a cost for its
accomplishment (mainly resource consumption). Severity of a risk can be represented
by an impact relation between the objective and the risk. Moreover, a DDP model
specifies how to compute the level of objectives achievement and the cost of mitiga-
tions. This calculation allows one to evaluate the impact of taken countermeasures and
then support the decision making process. Finally, a DDP model can be integrated
with other quantitative frameworks (e.g., FMECA, FTA) in order to model and assess
risks/failures [12].
Lee et al. [19] propose a framework for modeling critical systems (particularly,
socio-technical systems) which is based on a standard developed by US Department
of Defense (US-DoD), called DoD Information Technology Security Certification and
Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) [33]. The DITSCAP framework assesses the risk
caused by vulnerabilities and threats of a system by evaluating the implementation of
security requirements.
In the area of risk analysis, uncertain events (i.e., threats and failures) are quanti-
fied with two attributes: likelihood and severity. Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [3]
is widely used for quantitatively risk assessment, while approaches like FMECA [1]
quantify risk into qualitative values: frequent, reasonable probable, occasional, re-
mote, and extremely unlikely. Basically, events are prioritized using the notion of
“expectancy loss” which is a multiplication between the likelihood of events and its
severity. This priority represents the criticality of an event. When resources are lim-
ited, an analyst can decided to adopt countermeasures for mitigating events on the
basis of their priority. However, identification of probabilities is not necessarily pre-
cise, and typically it strongly depends on expert judgments. Approaches like Multi-
Attribute Risk Assessment [30] can improve the risk analysis process by considering
multi-attributes. Many factors like reliable, available, safety and confidentiality can
result critical for a system and each of them has its own risk value. This introduces the
need for the analyst to find the right trade-off among these factors. For instance, an Air
Traffic Management system is required to be always available and safe. Certain condi-
tions (e.g., radar noise) can affect the normal behavior of the system and consequently
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its safety. In many cases, the best solution is to restart the system. This, however, re-
duces the availability of the system. In [6], Butler presents how to choose cost-effective
countermeasures to deal with existing security threats by using multi-attribute risk as-
sessment.
Finally, CORAS [11] is aiming at developing a framework for risk analysis of se-
curity critical systems. The CORAS risk management consists of the following steps:
context identification, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk treat-
ment.
2.2 Paper Contribution
Though, the literature offers a variety of contributions in the area of risk analysis, a
lot must still be done to fully integrate these approaches in the software development
process. Our aim in this paper is to propose a framework to analyze risk since the
initial phases of the software analysis, particularly when the analyst needs to analyze
not only the system-to-be but also the organizational setting in which it will operate.
We strongly believe that an accurate risk analysis in this phase can improve the quality
of the entire software project. Moreover, most of the frameworks presented in literature
are mainly modeling frameworks without any, or a limited, capacity of reasoning and
automated analysis. In this paper, we extend the Tropos goal model [13, 28] with
concepts of risk and mitigation and we propose qualitative reasoning mechanisms to
consider risk as an evaluation criterion during the requirement analysis process.
3 Case Study
The case study we use in this paper originated within the European project SEREN-
ITY2 and focuses on a typical Loan Origination Process (LOP) that starts with the
receiving a loan application and ends, possibly, with the loan approval. When the bank
receives the application, it starts the process of verifying the data and calculating the
credit rating. The rating can be obtained either by an internal rating (in-house assess-
ment) or external rating (Credit Bureau). After the calculation, the bank defines the
loan schema, namely it defines the loan cap and its interest. We assume that the loan
schema is initially proposed by the customer, but is the bank that takes the final deci-
sion. The bank is, of course, also interested in ensuring the repayment of the loan and
having more income.
Several uncertain events (i.e., threats and un/intentional events) can affect the suc-
cess of the whole process. For example, forgery of the loan application, fake the identi-
fication document, ignorance of Credit Bureau about the bank condition, etc. Some of
these events are considered unacceptable and must be avoided. To do this, it is needed
to introduce some additional measures aiming at reducing the likelihood or the effects
of these events. However, these measures imply extra costs for the whole process and
they should be analyzed carefully before their adoption.
4 Tropos Goal Risk Framework
Tropos is a software development methodology that adopts the concept of agent and
its related mentalistic notions (e.g., goals, tasks, and resources) along all the phases of
2http://www.serenity-project.org/
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Figure 1: Goal-Risk Model
the development process [5]. The methodology spans from early requirements anal-
ysis up to implementation and uses goal models to represents agent (or more general
actor) mental states [14]. The key role of early requirements analysis is to model the
system-to-be together with the organizational setting where the system operates. In
the following we extend the Tropos goal modeling framework [13, 28] by introducing
constructs and relations specific for analyzing risk.
A Goal-Risk (GR) model is represented as a graph 〈N ,R〉, where N are nodes
and R are relations (see Fig. 1). N is comprised of goals, plans, and events. Goals
(depicted as ovals) are strategic interests that actors intend to achieve. Events (depicted
as pentagons) are uncertain circumstance which is out of the control of actors that can
have an impact (positively or negatively) on the fulfillment of goals. Tasks (depicted
as hexagons) are sequences of actions used to achieve goals or to treat the events3.
Each constructs has two attributes: SAT- Sat(G) and DEN- Den(G) . Such at-
tributes represent respectively the value of evidence that the construct will be satisfied
or denied. In the probability theory, if Prob(A) = 0.1 than we can infer that prob-
ability of ¬A is 0.9 (i.e., P (¬A) = 1 − P (A)). Conversely, based on the idea of
Dempster-Shafer theory [29] the evidence of the goal being denied (DEN) can not be
inferred from the satisfaction evidence (SAT) and vice versa. For instance, the bank has
the goal verify loan application, and the goal is affected by the event of having fake
3In this paper, we use hexagon only to denote an event treatment, and not to define as means to achieve
a goal.
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identity document. The only conclusion, we can infer, is the goal has DEN which is
introduced from the event, while we can not say anything about SAT because there is no
piece of information that can be categorized as satisfaction evidence. These attribute
values are qualitatively represented in the range of (F)ull, (P)artial, (N)one, with the
intended meaning F > P > N . Full (Partial, None) evidence for the satisfaction of
a gaol means that there is (at least) “sufficient” (“some”, “no”) evidence to support the
goal to be fulfilled. Analogously, Full (Partial, None) evidence for the denial of a goal
means that there is (at least) “sufficient” (“some”, “no”) evidence to support the goal
to be denial.
Relations R are represented as (N1, . . . , Nn) r7−→ N, where r is the type of the
relation, N1, . . . , Nn are called source nodes and N is the target node. r consists of
AND/OR-decomposition, contribution, alleviation, and impact relations. AND/OR de-
composition relations are used to refine goals, tasks, and events in order to produce a
finer structure. Contribution relations are used to model the impacts of a node over an-
other node. Basically, Tropos distinguishes 4 types of contribution relations: +,++,−,
and−−. Each type can propagate either evidence for SAT or DEN or both. For instance,
the “++” contribution relation indicates that the relation propagates both SAT and
DEN evidence, and the “++S” contribution relation means the relation only propa-
gates SAT evidence towards target nodes. The same intuition is applied for the other
types of contribution in delivering DEN evidence. However, the “−−” and “−” prop-
agate the crossing evidence. For instance, “−” propagates the SAT value of the source
node to the DEN value of the target node, and vice versa. Alleviation relations are used
to model the severity reduction of events. Essentially, alleviation relations are the same
of contribution relations (i.e., +,++,−,−−), but with a different semantic (see later
for the formal definition). Finally, an impact relation (depicted as dash line-arrow) rep-
resents the severity of an uncertain event in affecting the goal layer. This relation is
categorized as part of N and R in 〈N ,R〉. The detail of this relation and the reason
why it is categorized as a vertex instead of only an edge is detailed in the next event
layer subsection.
In the following subsections, we describe the three layers of the GR model through
the loan origination process case study.
4.1 Goal Layer
The goal layer is adopted from Tropos goal model [13] which analyzes strategic inter-
ests of the stakeholders. As shown in Fig. 2, the modeling starts with identifying top
goals of stakeholders (e.g., bank management) which are earn more income (G1),
receive loan application (G4), ensure repayment of loan (G7), and handle loan
application (G10).
Each top goal is refined using AND/OR decomposition into subgoals. For example,
G1 is OR-decomposed into earn from loan interest (G2) or charge high fee for
loan origination (G3). This can be seen as a way to model an alternative, indeed to
achieve G1 , one can either fulfill G2 or G3. In Tab. 1 the rules used to propagate
evidence trough AND/OR relations are presented (first two rows of the table). Thus,
Sat(G1) is calculated on the base of maximum value among SAT values of all its
subgoals (e.g., G2 and G3 ). Conversely, Den(G1) is defined as the minimum
value between DEN values of its subgoals. However, G10 is refined (AND) into verify
loan application (G11), assess application (G12), define loan schema (G15), and
approve loan application (G18). It means that to achieve G10 , all its subgoals (i.e.,
G11,G12,G15, and G18 ) must be satisfied. This decomposition process continues until
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Figure 2: Goal-Risk Model for Loan Originating Process
all leaf goals are tangible (i.e., there is an actor that can fulfill it).
The next step is to model interrelations among goals using contribution relations.
For instance, the goal receive electronic application (G6) supports the goal verify
loan application (G11) (i.e., G6
+S7−→ G11) because it promotes the possibility of doing
automatic verification. As presented in Tab. 1, “+” and “−” relation propagates at most
Partial evidence from source nodes, while “++” and “−−” may propagates at most
Full evidence. Differently, from [13] in GR model the goal layer may effect other lay-
ers. This allows us to model situations where a goal fulfillment increases/reduces the
occurrence of an event or a goal fulfillment supports/prevents countermeasures accom-
plishment. These two inter-layer relations are modeled using contribution relations.
4.2 Event Layer
In the GR framework we adopt the WordNet4 definition for event:
• something that happens at a given place and time;
• a special set of circumstances;
• a phenomenon located at a single point in space-time;
• a consequence; i.e., a phenomenon that follows and is caused by some previous
phenomena.
Essentially, the notion of event, here, is slightly different from threat [25] in computer
security and hazardous condition in reliability engineering [22]. Those concepts are
only defined as a potential circumstance that could cause harm or loss and not specify-
ing the notion of likelihood.
4http://wordnet.princeton.edu/
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Relation Sat(N1) Den(N1)
(N2, N3)
and7−→ N1 min
{
Sat(N2),
Sat(N3)
}
max
{
Den(N2),
Den(N3)
}
(N2, N3)
or7−→ N1 max
{
Sat(N2),
Sat(N3)
}
min
{
Den(N2),
Den(N3)
}
N2
+S7−→ N1 min
{
Sat(N2),
P
}
N
N2
++S7−→ N1 Sat(N2) N
N2
+D7−→ N1 N min
{
Den(N2),
P
}
N2
++D7−→ N1 N Den(N2)
N2
−S7−→ N1 N min
{
Sat(N2),
P
}
N2
−−S7−→ N1 N Sat(N2)
N2
−D7−→ N1 min
{
Den(N2),
P
}
N
N2
−−D7−→ N1 Den(N2) N
Table 1: Evidence Propagation Rules for (AND/OR) Decomposition and Contribution
Relations
Following the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approach [3], the GR frame-
work characterizes events with two properties: likelihood and severity. Likelihood
is modeled as a property of an event, whereas severity is denoted as the sign (nega-
tive/positive) of an impact relation. This representation allows us to model situations
where an event impacts on more than a single goal. For instance, in Fig. 2 the event
collusion between customer and clerk (E10) obstructs the satisfaction of the goal
defined by bank (G17) in defining loan schema because the officer may not be ob-
jective. On the other hand, it also obstructs the goal assessed by in-house (G14)
since it can compromise the integrity of the employees that assess the loan application.
Moreover, an event becomes a risk when it produces a negative effect, alternatively
an opportunity when it produces positive effects. This flexibility allows an analyst to
model an event which acts as a risk and an opportunity at the same time. For instance,
in Fig. 2 the event increase interest rate of loan (E1) can be seen as a risk for the
goal ensure repayment of loan (G7) and as an opportunity for the goal earn from
loan interest (G2). The analyst should realize that it is not convenient to eliminate
totally the risk, since the event introduces also advantages, but rather it is better to
mitigate its negative effects.
The identification of the events can be realized using different approaches, such
as obstacle analysis [35], anti-goal [34], hazard analysis [18], misuse case [31], abuse
case [24], taxonomy-base risk identification [7], or risk in finance [16]. Afterwards,
each event is decomposed into sub-events until each leaf event can be easily assessed
and paying attention to ensure that sub-events are disjoint events. To model dependency
among events, one can use contribution relations, such as E12
+S7−→ E11 in the case
study.
As we have already said an event can be characterized by two properties: likelihood
and severity. In our framework, we calculate the likelihood of an event (λ(E)) from
the level of evidence that supports (SAT) and prevents (DEN) the occurrence of the
event. The likelihood is represented qualitatively with the following values: (L)ikely,
(O)ccasional, (R)are, and (U)nlikely, with intended meaning L > O > R > U .
Tab. 2 defines the calculation rules of likelihood from SAT and DEN values. An event
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Sat(E) ∧Den(E) 7−→ λ(E)
Sat(E) Den(E) λ(E)
F N L
F P O
P N O
F F R
P F R
P P R
N F/P/N U
Table 2: Likelihood Calculation based on Evidence Values
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
h
hh
Impact Relation
λ(E) L O R U
Sat(G)
E
++7−→ G F P P N
E
+7−→ G P P N N
Den(G)
E
−−7−→ G F P P N
E
−7−→ G P P N N
Table 3: Evidence Propagation Rules for Impact Relation
with full evidence of being satisfied and no evidence of denial implies a likely event.
Consequently, an event without any evidence of satisfaction results to be an unlikely
event, no matter the value of denial evidence.
By severity, we mean the influence of an event to the goal fulfillment. This defini-
tion is similar with the one in FMECA [1] or impact given in DDP [12]. This property
is classified as follows:
• Strong Positive(++) - the event occurrence produces a strong contribution to the
goal satisfaction;
• Positive(+) - the event occurrence produces a fair contribution to the goal satis-
faction;
• Negative(−) - the event occurrence produces a fair contribution to the goal de-
nial;
• Strong Negative(−−) - the event occurrence produces a strong contribution to
the goal denial.
This classification is encoded as the sign of an impact relation which connect the event
layer with the goal layer. Impact relations introduce new evidence for the goal layer,
and the value of new evidence depends on the likelihood of the event and the sign of
impact relation (Tab. 3). The rule specifies that an event propagates full evidence of
satisfaction to the goal layer if its likelihood is likely and connected by “++” impact
relation (called an opportunity). Conversely, an event produces partial evidence of
denial, when connected by “−−” and has occasional/rare likelihood, or in the case it
is connected by “−” with likely/occasional likelihood (called risk).
Impact relation is a hybrid construct in 〈N ,R〉. In other word, it is categorized as a
relation in R , but it is also a node in N . Analogously, we introduce another relation,
called alleviation, that connects a treatment with the impact relation. This allows us to
model a treatments as a mitigation for the reduction of the severity (e.g., −− 7−→ −).
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Alleviation
Impact Initial Rewrite
T
−−7−→ [Impact] E −−7−→ G E ∅7−→ G
E
−7−→ G E ∅7−→ G
T
−7−→ [Impact] E −−7−→ G E −7−→ G
E
−7−→ G E ∅7−→ G
Table 4: Rewriting Rules for Alleviation Relation
We can treat the impact relation as an end node of the alleviation relation. The detail
about alleviation relations will explain in the next subsection.
4.3 Treatment Layer
Once the goal and event layers have been analyzed, the analyst identifies and analyzes
the countermeasures to be adopted in order to mitigate risks in the GR model. Treat-
ments/countermeasures can be analyzed using (AND/OR) decomposition and contri-
bution relations. Essentially, the mitigation operates in two different ways: reducing
the likelihood or reducing the severity. To reduce the likelihood, a countermeasure is
modeled using a contribution relation which introduces denial evidence to the event.
For instance, the treatment employ intrusion detection system (T4) adds denial evi-
dence for the risk forgery from external attack (E3), and consequently applying rules
of Tab. 2 it results a less likely event.
To reduce the impact, we introduce the alleviation relation, as mention before.
This relation intends to reduce the severity of the impact sign; in Fig. 2 for example,
the relation between the treatment use digital signature (T1) to the impact relation
between the event Forge Electronic Application (E2) and goal receive electronic
application (G6). This relation is not intended to reduce the likelihood, but rather to
reduce the severity of the risk E2 (i.e., T1
−7−→ [E2 −−7−→ G6]) by rewriting E2 −−7−→ G6
into E2
−7−→ G6. The production rules for this relation are presented in Tab. 4. For
the sake of simplicity, we just consider whether the treatment is selected or not and we
do not take the treatment evidence into account. Alleviation relations reduce only the
“negative” impact relations, and ∅ indicates there is no impact between the event and
the goal.
In our model, we also allow for relations between the treatment layer and the goal
layer. This is useful to model situations where a countermeasure adopted to mitigate
a risk has also a contribution (especially negative) to some goal. For instance, the
countermeasure use digital signature can mitigate the event forge of electronic
application, but it also introduces new additional costs that can be seen as denial evi-
dence for the goal have low cost loan origination process.
5 Risk Analysis Process
In this section, we describe the methodological process and qualitative risk reasoning
techniques used to analyze and evaluate alternative goal models. Particularly, the prob-
lem we focus on is to find and evaluate all possible ways to satisfy top goals with an
acceptable level of risk. In other words, given a GR model, each OR decomposition in-
troduces alternative modalities for top goals satisfaction, namely different sets of leafs
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goals that can satisfy top goals. Each of these alternative solutions may have a different
cost and may introduce a different level of risk. Risk can be mitigated with appropriate
countermeasures, which, however introduce extra costs that have to be added to the
cost of the solution.
The analysis process is described in the Algorithm 1 and consists of the following
three steps:
1. find alternative solutions (line 2-3),
2. evaluate each alternative against relevant risks (line 5-6)
3. assess the countermeasures to mitigate risks (line 9-15).
The process starts taking in input the GR model, a set of desired satisfaction val-
ues for top goals (desired labels), acceptable risk values (acc risks), and a num-
ber of goals as possible candidates for the final solution (input goals). For instance,
we might desire to have full evidence for satisfaction of goals G4 and G10 (i.e.,
Sat(G4) = F and Sat(G10) = F ), while we do not care about goals G1 and G7
admitting partial evidence for their satisfaction (i.e., Sat(G1)=P and Sat(G7)=P
). We might be also interested to not run any risk for G1 and G7 (i.e.,Den(G1)=N
and Den(G7) =N ) while we can admit partial evidence for the denial of G4 and
G10 (i.e., Den(G4) = P and Den(G10) = P ). As input goals, we may want to
consider the set {G2,G3,G5,G6,G8,G9,G11,G13,G14,G16,G17,G19, G20}.
Algorithm 1 Risk Analysis Process
Require: goal model 〈N ,R〉, label array top goals, node array input goals, label array events
1: solution array solution {solution that has already encompassed risks and necessary countermeasures}
2: alt solution←Backward Reasoning(〈N ,R〉, desired labels,
nil, input goals)
3: candidate solution←Select Can Solution(alt solution)
{candidate solution ⊆ alt solution}
4: for all Si ∈ candidate solution do
5: if Satisfy(〈N ,R〉, desired labels, acc risks,
〈Si, events,nil〉) then
6: add(solution, 〈Si,nil, Calc Cost(Si,nil)〉)
7: else
8: max labels←Backward Reasoning(〈N ,R〉,
desired labels, acc risks, goals(Si))
9: cur labels←Forward Reasoning(〈N ,R〉,
〈Si, events,nil〉)
10: rel treatments←Find Treatments(〈N ,R〉,
cur labels,max labels)
11: for all Cj ∈ 2rel treatment do
12: if Satisfy(〈N ,R〉, desired labels, acc risks,
〈Si, events, Cj〉) then
13: add(solution, 〈Si, Cj , Calc Cost(Si, Cj)〉)
14: end if
15: end for
16: end if
17: end for
Backward Reasoning (line 2) generates a set of possible assignment values of
evidence for the input goals that satisfy the desired values (desired labels). Essen-
tially, Backward Reasoning is the top-down reasoning mechanism proposed in [28],
where goal models are encoded into satisfiability formulas and then SAT solvers are
used to find which input-goals can satisfy top goals. The use of the standard Tropos
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backward reasoning is limited to the goal layer (i.e., not considering the relations with
the other two layers), and without specifying any constraints. So for instance, in order
to achieve desired labels in our case study we have 8 alternative solutions (see Tab. 5)
as follows:
• S1=G2,G5,G8,G9,G11,G13,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S2=G3,G5,G8,G9,G11,G13,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S3=G2,G6,G8,G9,G11,G13,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S4=G3,G6,G8,G9,G11,G13,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S5=G2,G5,G8,G9,G11,G14,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S6=G3,G5,G8,G9,G11,G14,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S7=G2,G6,G8,G9,G11,G14,G16,G17,G19,G20
• S8=G3,G6,G8,G9,G11,G14,G16,G17,G19,G20
with full SAT evidence for all goals except for G2 , G3 , G8 , and G9 which might be
partial SAT. Among these solutions, the analyst chooses one of them candidate solution
(line 3) on the basis of a certain criterion, like for example minimum-cost [28]. Sup-
pose, the analyst decides to choose alternatives with a cost less than 30 (S4, S7, and S8
in our case – see Tab. 5).
Each candidate solution is now evaluated against risk and possibly necessary
countermeasures are introduced (line 4-17). First, the analyst checks whether the
candidate solution (e.g., S4), together with risks in the event layer (events), still
can obtain the desired values of evidence for top goals. To do this, Satisfy uses
the Forward Reasoning mechanism adapted from [13] which propagates evidence
values of inputs throughout the goal model. Final evidence values for top goals are
compared with those initially desired. If DEN values for top goals are equal/less than
the maximum risk admitted (acc risks) and SAT values for top goals are equal/great
than the desired values (desired labels), then the candidate solution is added di-
rectly to the solution and its cost is calculated (line 6). Otherwise, countermea-
sures must be introduced in the candidate solution (line 10-15). The adaptation of
Forward Reasoning will detail at the end of this section.
In order to define countermeasures, the analyst calculates the maximum DEN val-
ues of input goals (max labels) that produce acceptable DEN values for top goals. This
means we need to find a set of countermeasures able to mitigate risk, so that we have
at most the acceptable risk level (acc risks). We calculate max labels values using
Backward Reasoning (line 8) and specifying the goals of the candidate solution as
input goal and acc risks as a constraint for the DEN value of input goals. Forward Reasoning
(line 9) propagates evidence values of the candidate solution and events throughout
the model, so that the evidence values of all goals are defined (cur labels). By having
two set of values (i.e., cur labels andmax labels), we can find treatments to mitigate
risks.
To this end, we propose Find Treatments (Algorithm 2) which enumerates all
the possible set of treatments that may mitigate risks. By comparing DEN in the
max labels and the cur labels, one can identify which goals are overvalued. For
instance, given S4 (Tab. 5) the goal G6 in max labels is defined as Den(G6) =P ,
whereas in cur labels is Den(G6) =F (see Tab. 6 column Event-Out). Afterwards,
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Algorithm 2 Find Treatments
Require: goal model 〈N ,R〉, label array current, label array max
1: array rel events, rel alleviations, rel treatments
2: for all ci ∈ current ∧ isGoal(ci) do
3: if ci.den > max[i].den then
4: tmp events←related(〈N ,R〉, ci){find all related events of goal ci}
5: add(rel events, tmp events)
6: for ej ∈ tmp events do
7: for Rk ∈ R s.t. source(Rk) = ej ∧ target(Rk) = ci do
8: tmp alleviations←related(〈N ,R〉, Rk){find all relevant allevation relations of goal ci}
9: add(rel alleviation, tmp alleviation)
10: end for
11: end for
12: end if
13: end for
14: for all ei ∈ rel events do {find all possible treatments for reducing likelihood of related events}
15: tmp←related(〈N ,R〉, ei)
16: add(rel treatments, tmp)
17: end for
18: for all ai ∈ rel alleviation do {find all possible treatments for reducing severity of related events}
19: for all Rj ∈ 〈N ,R〉 s.t. Rj = ai do
20: add(rel treatments, [source(Rj)])
21: end for
22: end for
23: return treatments
we need to define the related events that may cause this level of risk5. In our case, the
relevant events for G6 are E2 , E3 , and E4 . Once we have identified the rel events,
we can find the treatments (rel treatments) that can mitigate these events (line 14-
22). As we discuss before, the mitigation operates reducing likelihood and severity. In
the case of E2 , E3 , and E4 , the treatments that reduces the severity are T2 and T3 ,
while T4 and T5 reduce likelihood.
However, it could be the case that some treatment in rel treatments has an over-
lapped effect in reducing risks with other treatments. Thus, we evaluate each subset
of rel treatments whether it is adequate to mitigate the risks, such that they (i.e.,
candidate solution, subset of rel treatments) satisfy the evidence values specified
in desired labels and acc risks. Then, the treatments and the input goals can be
added to the solution and the cost is calculated (Algorithm 1 line 13).
Forward Reasoning (Algorithm 3), essentially, is the adaptation of the one pro-
posed in [13]. The algorithm consists of two main loops. The first loop propagates the
input evidence throughout the GR model updating the nodes’ labels without consid-
ering alleviation relations (line 5-10). Update Label (Algorithm 4) updates SAT and
DEN following the relation defined in Tab. 1 (for decomposition and contribution re-
lations line 6-7) and Tab. 3 (for impact relation line 3-4). Based on this result and
looking at the evidence values, we can identify which treatments are adopted. Thus,
using Apply Alleviation (Algorithm 5) we rewrite the sign of impact relations that
are mitigated by treatments – the rules (Tab. 4) are encoded in the line 3 of the algo-
rithm. Afterwards, the rewritten GR model (〈N ,R〉) is again evaluated in the second
loop. Here, the final values for all nodes are calculated using all relations, including
the alleviation ones.
5Related is meant to enumerate all the nodes that is reachable from a certain node in 〈N ,R〉
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Algorithm 3 Forward Reasoning
Require: goal model 〈N ,R〉, label array initial
1: label array current, old
2: current←initial
3: i←0
4: repeat
5: while old 6= current do
6: old←current
7: for allNi ∈ N ∧ ¬is Impact(Ni) do
8: current[i]←Update Label(i, 〈N ,R〉, old)
9: end for
10: end while
11: if i=0 then
12: Apply Alleviation(〈N ,R〉, current)
13: old←nil
14: end if
15: i++
16: until i=2
17: return current
Algorithm 4 Update Label
Require: int i, goal model 〈N ,R〉, label array old
1: for all Rj ∈ R s.t. target(Rj) = Ni do
2: if is Impact(Rj) then
3: satij = Apply Imp Sat(Ni, Rj , Old)
4: denij = Apply Imp Den(Ni, Rj , Old)
5: else {decomposition and contribution relations}
6: satij = Apply Rules Sat(Ni, Rj , Old)
7: denij = Apply Rules Den(Ni, Rj , Old)
8: end if
9: end for
10: return {max(max array(satij), Old[i].sat),
max(max array(denij), Old[i].den)}
Algorithm 5 Apply Alleviation
Require: goal model 〈N ,R〉, label array current
1: for allNk ∈ N ∧ 〉∫ Im√acunionsq(N‖) do
2: for all Rl ∈ R ∧ 〉∫ Allev〉aunionsq〉o\(Rl) do
3: Nk ←Update Sign(Rl, current)
4: end for
5: end for
14
Figure 3: Goal Risk Tool
6 GR-Tool and Experimental Results
The tool we have developed is an extension of the Goal Reasoning Tool6 (GR-Tool)
developed within the Tropos project. Basically, the tool (Fig. 3) is a graphical tool in
which it is possible to draw GR models and run algorithms presented in the previous
section. The algorithms have been fully implemented in JAVA and are embedded in the
tool.
To test our approach and its implementation, we run a number of experiments with
the loan origination process case study that we summarize briefly in the following.
Let’s start from the situation where we are interested to obtain partial evidence
for the satisfaction of top-goals earn more income (G1) and ensure repayment
of loan (G7), while full evidence for top-goals receive loan application (G4) and
handle loan application (G10). Suppose also, that the maximum level of risk we are
willing to run is Den(G4) = P ,Den(G10) = P ,Den(G1) =N , and Den(G7) =N
. Given these inputs, the set of possible solutions is reported in Tab. 5. Note that these
solutions do not consider risk for the moment. The total cost of each solution is cal-
culated summing up the cost of each leaf goal (input goal). Among these solutions,
6http://sesa.dit.unitn.it/goaleditor/
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Input Goal Cost S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
G02-Earn from Loan Interest 3 X X X X
G03-Charge High Fee for LOP 2 X X X X
G05-Receive Hard-copy App. 5 X X X X
G06-Receive Electronic App. 3 X X X X
G08-Ask Mortgage 2 X X X X X X X X
G09-Monitor Usage of Loan 4 X X X X X X X X
G11-Verify Loan Application 3 X X X X X X X X
G13-Assessed by CB 10 X X X X
G14-Assessed by In-house 8 X X X X
G16-Proposed by Customer 1 X X X X X X X X
G17-Defined by Bank 3 X X X X X X X X
G19-Approved by Clerk 1 X X X X X X X X
G20-Approved by Manager 1 X X X X X X X X
Cost 33 32 31 30 31 30 29 28
Table 5: Cost of Alternative Solutions
43 42 42
46
42
45 44 44
48
44 43 43
47
0
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
42
45
48
S4+C1 S4+C2 S4+C3 S4+C4 S6+C5 S7+C6 S7+C7 S7+C8 S7+C9 S8+C6 S8+C7 S8+C8 S8+C9
Cost Total Risk
Figure 4: Comparison Total Risk and Total Cost among All Candidate Alternatives and
Their Treatments
suppose we decide to focus on solutions with a cost lesser than 30, that are S4, S6,
S7, and S8. Particularly, let’s consider S4 with the initial assignment for input goals
as reported in Tab. 6 (column “Goal-In”). This assignment satisfies the desired val-
ues for top-goals (column “Goal-Out”). Now if we introduce the assignment to events
reported in column “Event-In”, the desired values for top goals are not anymore sat-
isfied (“Event-Out”). For instance, G4 has full DEN evidence, while the acceptable
value was at most partial. This happens since goal receive loan application (G4) is
satisfied by receive electronic application (G6) goal, which has full DEN evidence
(i.e., Den(G6) = F ). We have a similar situation for G7 and G10 . To make S4
acceptable, possible sets of treatments are C1, C2, C3, and C4 in Tab. 7. As reported
in column “Treat-Out” in Tab. 6, C1 satisfies again the desired values for top-goals
(DEN values for G4 and G10 are now partial, while goal G7 has no evidence for
denial). However, the adoption of C1 introduces an additional cost for S4 that is now
30+13=43.
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Goal Event Treat.
In Out In Out In Out
S S D S S D S S D
E01-Increase Interest Rate of Loan - - - - - - - - -
E02-Forge Electronic Application - - - - F - - F -
E03-Forgery from External Attack - - - F F - F F -
E04-Forgery from Internal Breach - - - F F - F F P
E05-Cust Fails to Fulfill Loan Sch - - - - P - - P -
E06-Fake Identity Document - - - F F - F F F
E07-Fake Application - - - P P - P P -
E08-Credit Bureau Ignorance - - - P P - P P -
E09-Mispredict Monetary Cond. - - - F F - F F -
E10-Collusion Customer-Clerk - - - P P - P P -
E11-Cust. Unemployment - - - P P - P P -
E12-Economic Crisis - - - - - - - - -
G01-Earn More Income - P - - P - - P -
G02-Earn from Loan Interest - - - - - - - - -
G03-Charge High Fee for LOP P P - P P - P P -
G04-Receive Loan Application - F - - F F F F P
G05-Receive Hard-copy App. - - - - - - - - -
G06-Receive Electronic App. F F - F F F F F P
G07-Ensure Repayment of Loan - P - - P P - P -
G08-Ask Mortgage F F - F F - F F -
G09-Monitor Usage of Loan P P - P P - P P -
G10-Handle Loan Application - F - - F F - F P
G11-Verify Loan Application F F - F F F F F P
G12-Assess Application - F - - F P - F -
G13-Assessed by Credit Bureau F F - F F P F F -
G14-Assessed by In-house - - - - - - - - -
G15-Define Loan Schema - F - - F P - F P
G16-Proposed by Customer F F - F F P F F P
G17-Defined by Bank F F - F F - F F -
G18-Approve Loan Application - F - - F - - F -
G19-Approved by Clerk F F - F F - F F -
G20-Approved by Manager F F - F F - F F -
T01-Use Digital Signature - - - - - - - P -
T02-Have Digital Signature Inf. - - - - - - P P -
T03-Install Public Key Inf. - - - - - - P P -
T04-Employ Intrusion Det. Sys. - - - - - - - - -
T05-Employ Strict Access Control - - - - - - - P -
T06-Hire Underwriter - - - - - - P P -
T07-Verify ID doc with Gov. DB - - - - - - F F -
T08-Assign Liaison Officer for CB - - - - - - P P -
T09-Train Internal Actuary - - - - - - - - -
T10-Assess App. Anonymously - - - - - - - - -
Table 6: SAT-DEN Values of S4-alternative and C1-treatments
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S4 S6 S7/S8
Treatment Cost C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
T02 2 X X X X
T03 2 X X X X X X
T04 1 X X X X X X
T05 2 X X X X
T06 4 X X X X X X X X X
T07 3 X X X X X X X X X
T08 2 X X X X
T09 3 X X X X X
T10 2 X X X X X
Total Cost 13 12 12 16 12 16 15 15 19
Table 7: Cost of Possible Treatments
A similar analysis can be done for the other selected solutions S6, S7 and S8 (i.e.,
those with a cost lesser than 30). The set of treatments for S6 is C5, while for S7 and
S8 can be either C6, C7, C8, or C9. Their costs are reported in Tab. 7.
Fig. 4 shows the comparison among costs and risks for all solutions and related
treatments. The total risk is calculated assuming Null=1, Partial=2, and Full=3 and
summing up the DEN values for all top goals. This means that for the acceptable risk
level (i.e., Den(G1) = N ,Den(G4) = P ,Den(G7) = N , and Den(G10) = P ),
we can have at most the total risk 1+1+2+2=6. Note that S6+C5 has a lower total
risk w.r.t. the others (i.e., C6+C5 total risk=5) and is cheaper than the initial S4+C1
we considered. So S6+C5 seems to be the most convenient solution to be adopted.
However, the consequence of adopting S6+C5 is that the customers cannot submit
their loan application electronically, and the analyst should consider this in the choice.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a framework to model and reason about risk within
the requirements engineering process. We have adopt and extended the Tropos goal
modeling framework and proposed qualitative reasoning algorithms to analyze risk
during the process of evaluation and selection of alternatives.
Our approach has some limitations that we would like to overcome in our future
work. Particularly, the fact that we combine evidence values of satisfaction and denial
using simple maximum and minimum metrics does not allow us to represent the differ-
ence among countermeasures that are adopted in the solution. For instance, the solution
S4+C1 has the same level of risk of S4+C4, but S4+C4 adopts more treatments than
the former. Moreover, even if the three qualitative values used for SAT and DEN can be
extended including more intermediate values, as we done for Tropos goal models we
would like to propose quantitative reasoning mechanisms where evidence is expressed
in term of probability.
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